CHAPTER - III

INDIA CHINA BORDER DISPUTE AND BILATERAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER: III

INDIA - CHINA BORDER DISPUTE AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

3.1. INTRODUCTION:

This Chapter deals with border dispute encompassing bilateral relations and political negotiations between India and China. Both the contending powers had not paid enough attention to identifying their common international border due to a peculiar nature of their border areas. Therefore, preferred demarcation of the international border with concession was a remote possibility. Obviously, historical geography of the Himalayan region is one of the important factors which has been discussed in the last Chapter, has to be taken into consideration while dealing with conflicting situations in the contending countries.

In Asia, India is the only country which can challenge the supremacy of China. India is the dominant power in South Asian region and China has been emerging as an influential East Asian power respectively. Chinese are willing to be the dominant power in South Asia too. China has settled her border dispute with India's neighbours [Pakistan, Burma, Nepal and very soon, even Bhutan]. Amongst the South Asian countries, the border dispute with India only has assumed the proportion of a "prestige issue". Therefore, one has to go into the details of their relations, political aspects, claims and counter claims and views on border dispute.

3.2. STATUS OF INDIA-CHINA BORDER BY 1950:

The Himalayas is regarded as a Northern frontier of India since the ancient period. The Northern frontier of India, mostly based on the crest line of the Himalayan Ranges, has been universally recognised as the frontier of India for well over 300 years. Indeed, Himalayas being a natural barrier, kept away China and India from any political, Military confrontation for centuries. India gained her freedom on 15th August 1947. India accepted the Himalayan frontier as a part of her inheritance. Communists achieved success on 1st October 1949 and China emerged as a Peoples Republic of China. From 1949 to 1958 China never objected about her traditional frontier with India till 23rd January 1959.
Sketch No. 9: - Shows Traditional Northern Boundary Of India.

By the end of 1950s, roughly the frontier area between India and China was as follows:-

By the end of 1950, India's Northern frontier was a traditional one (please see Sketch No 9). In the Western Sector from North-West of Kashmir, it was passing along the watershed formed by the Mustagh, the Karakoram and the Kuen Lun ranges to a point East of Longitude 80°. Thereafter it was turning South and running along the Chang-Chenmo range. Cutting along the Pangang Tso and the Spanggur Tso, it was passing through the Chang Pass and along the Kailash range. It then turns Southwest near Demchok and skirting the Hanle mountains, cuts across the Para Chu river South of Chumar. It then follows the watershed between the Ganges and Satlej to the Tri junction of India, Nepal and China. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet is also a watershed, while the crest of the Himalayas forms the boundary between Bhutan and Tibet. The Northeast frontier of India is about 710 miles long from the Eastern limits of Bhutan to a point near the Talu Pass is the Northern watershed of Brahmaputra excepting where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri and Namjang Rivers break through.1

By the end of 1950, India was still trying to consolidate its position as a sovereign independent nation and was preoccupied with its own internal problems in the wake of her partition. And accepted the Himalayan frontier as a part of its inheritance. The Government of India did not open any border outpost right along the traditional frontier because the area was sparsely inhabited in the Western Sector. Being a successor state and part of its inheritance, she accepted that her Northeast frontier between Tibet and Northeastern India had already been fixed at the Simla Conference in 1914. Development programme of building roads, airstrips, and hospitals in the area was undertaken to provide administration and political control over the tribal people in NEFA.

Chinese also were engrossed in their own teething convulsions. As soon as they consolidated themselves, on 30 September, 1950, they decided to "liberate Tibet". The Chinese were deeply involved in Tibetans affairs. They had never raised any doubts or questions about her border with India. Once she grabbed Tibet, it was only thereafter that India deployed her forces along the traditional border. And then for the first time, Indian and Chinese forces faced each other.
3.3. INDIA CHINA RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1962 WAR:

India achieved her freedom on 15th August 1947 and China emerged as a communist state and came to be known as a "Peoples' republic of China" on 1st October 1949. India is the first non-communist country who recognised China and pleaded her case for membership to the United Nations Organisation. In spite of being engrossed in their own teething convulsions, both the countries maintained "diplomatic relations". Communist China however, were not happy about the "non-aligned policy" of India and openly criticised India as a stooge of western imperialists. When the communist party of India sent greetings to Mao - Tse - Tung, for a grand success of communist revolution, he expressed his desire by following statement (19th October 1949):-

"I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, India will one day emerge in the Socialist and Peoples Democratic family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the History of mankind."2

The above mentioned statement of Mao - Tse - Tung shows that since 1948, Chinese had displayed rigid attitude towards Democratic India. On the contrary, India had adopted flexible and cooperative approach towards China. This approach is clearly reflected in the following statement of Prime Minister Pundit Jawahar Lal Nehru:-

"Any policy towards China would have to take into consideration the close proximity of the two nations having a frontier of 2,000 miles... We have to consider our policy in regard to China remembering not only whatever past we may have had, that we have to live together in peace and friendship, and I hope, cooperation."3

Despite such an attitude, India continued to be sympathetic to China particularly at the time of Korean conflict. After the Korean conflict, communist China had taken on an ideological task of spreading communism in the other parts of the world. Under this pretext, she reiterated her determination "to liberate Tibet from imperialistic aggression. It was quite clear that the communist China had planned to subjugate "independent Tibet".
3.3.1. The Question of Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: Tibet was an independent state. Throughout the History, she had enjoyed the status of an independent state. It was only during the Manchu regime that Tibet was successfully attacked by China from 1720 A.D. to 1792 A.D. Even during the suzerainty of the Manchu, the Tibetan Government had its own currency and conducted its foreign affairs and operated its own Army. In short, China left Tibet free to organise its own defence as the imperial power became weak. 4

Apart from close cultural contacts between India and Tibet throughout the Centuries, India had certain political and economical rights in Tibet as part of its cultural inheritance. The British Government sent a limited military expedition to Lhasa under Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband in 1904 A.D. which resulted in the Lhasa convention of September 1904. By this convention, the British secured the right to establish trade agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung in Tibet and also a commitment about the express exclusion of any other foreign power from wielding political influence there. The convention was signed between Great Britain and Tibet without any reference to China. 5 This convention proved that Tibet could act independent of China even in the matter of foreign policy "without let or fear" [please see for details of convention Appendix No 7].

British maintained a mission in Lhasa from 1936 to 1947 and dealt directly with the Tibetan Government. In July, 1947, the British and the Indian Governments formally informed the Tibetan government that after the transfer of power, British obligations and rights under the existing treaties would devolve upon India. In the meanwhile, the British Mission at "Lhasa" formally became the "Indian Mission" on 15th August 1947. And Tibetan Government formally announced its acceptance of the formal relationship with independent India. 6

Chinese occupation of Tibet: On 7th October 1950, without any warning or ultimatum, forty thousand troops of the 18th and 62nd Chinese peoples Liberation Army had entered into Tibet "to liberate the people of Tibet from imperialism." On 25th October 1950, Peking announced :-

"Units of the Chinese Peoples Army have been ordered to cross over into Tibet in order to free three million Tibetans from Western Imperialist oppression and to consolidate national defences on Chinese Western border." 7
In view of this announcement by the Chinese, India suggested that the question of Tibet should be settled by peaceful means. In response to India's policy regarding Tibet, China gave a note to the Government of India on 30 October 1950 in which offensive language was used. The Chinese stated:

"Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely the domestic problem of China on which no foreign interference shall be tolerated."

The opposition parties brought tremendous pressure upon the Government (ruling party) in the Parliament to take a firm definite stand (military action) in the context of Tibet. Mr. M.C. Chagla, foreign Minister appealed to the House:

"The only result of such a course might be a flare-up on our Border or more oppression. Not only that, it might result in more oppression, more cruelty against the Tibetans. I do not believe in making empty gestures - it is of no use unless I have the power and strength to implement any decision that I take."

The above statement shows that India was not militarily strong and in a position to mount an invasion on Tibet, against Peoples Liberation Army of China. Therefore India's stand on Tibet was that the Chinese authorities would not use force against the Tibetans but win them over by friendly gestures and cooperation and preserve the autonomy of Tibet within the frame-work of Chinese suzerainty.

So the Chinese military action in Tibet was not a full scale military operation but was more in the nature of military pressure on Tibetan Government to force the latter to accept the Chinese suzerainty. The negotiations started in Peking on 29th April 1951 and at last, a Seventeen Point Agreement was signed on 23rd May 1951 between the Tibetan Government and the Peoples Republic of China. (for details of 17 Point Agreement, please see Appendix No 10). This Agreement brought India, Nepal and Bhutan face to face with China and destroyed the buffer state between India and China. By this Agreement, Tibet allowed China to station her troops on her frontiers. The occupation of Tibet by China was a diplomatic defeat for India. For centuries, Tibet had served as a buffer state between India and China.
3.3.2. India's Steps in Response to Chinese Occupation of Tibet:

a] Alliance With Himalayan Kingdom: Chinese military action in Tibet destroyed the buffer State between India and China. For long, Tibet kept India and China away from any confrontation for centuries on account of physical distance due to existence of Tibet. According to "Seventeen Point Agreement", Tibet allowed China to station her troops on her frontiers and automatically the physical distance diminished between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Himalayan kingdom thereafter, felt the pressure of Chinese aggression. So the Government of India immediately took appropriate steps to strengthen her position along the Himalayan frontier. On 8th August 1949, India signed treaty with Bhutan which enabled India to conduct her foreign policy in return for an annual subsidy of Rs 5 Lakhs. At the same time, on July 31st, 1950 Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed to strengthen the neighbourly friendship. Further, India provided assistance to Nepal for training in Arms, Civil Services, building roads and setting up schools. Regarding Sikkim, India entered into a similar treaty with it, on 5th December 1950 which stipulated that:

"Sikkim shall continue to be a protectorate of India and shall enjoy autonomy in regards to its internal affairs." (now Sikkim is part of India).

By this Treaty, the Government of India undertook the responsibility for:

"the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim and acquired the right to station her troops anywhere within Sikkim."12

(b) The Himmat Singh Committee: Chinese conquest of Tibet exposed the Northern frontier of India to a potential threat. In order to survey the defence and security problems of North and Northeast, the Government of India appointed Himmat Singh Committee on 1st October 1950, under the chairmanship of Deputy Director Of Military Operations, Brigadier (later, Major General) Himmat Singhji. Major General Kulwant Singh, Chief of the General Staff, was also appointed as the Head of this committee. The Committee considered that the Assam Rifles as one of the means of fulfilling this task. The role of Assam Rifles was determined as follows:-
a) Defence of the International border in the Northeast.

b) Maintenance of law and order in the tribal area.

c) Maintenance of defence, and security of the other areas if police fails to cope up with the situation.13

In addition, the Government of India took certain measures to guard the Northern frontiers in the forward areas near the Indo-Tibetan border in Ladakh, U.P. and the Northeast frontier area. The nature of these measures was only to "extend the government's administration and political control in neglected region" and were in no way adequate to meet the growing Chinese threat. China on the other hand, ever since her conquest of Tibet, began to consolidate its position and set up military posts along Tibet's border with India.

3.3.3. Chinese Policy of Assimilation In Tibet:- To check the Tibetan revolt and unrest, China started her efforts to tighten its grip on Tibet. For achieving this purpose, it was essential to eliminate, step by step, the Indian influence over Tibet. With a view to wiping out the last traces of Indian connection with Tibet, China began to put serious obstacles in the functioning of the Indian Consulate, trade posts, pilgrims and traders.14 Through this act, China indirectly attempted to violate the Panchsheel Agreement. At the same time, she systematically started to implement her assimilation policies in Tibet. She deployed Peoples Liberation Army in large numbers and stationed Nuclear Missiles as well. In order to obviate any objections by the world at large, or the U.N.O. citing the presence of a distinct Tibetan culture, China systematically and rapidly sought destruction of Tibetan traditions and culture. Tibetan girls were forced to get married to Chinese youth. The Han Chinese were encouraged to settle in Tibet in large numbers. In the schools, education was being imparted in Tibetan language; now it is in Chinese. The Tibetan Monks and youth were tortured by the Peoples Liberation Army. In short, to maintain stranglehold over Tibet, Militarisation, Modernisation and Nuclearisation of Tibet is being continued by the Chinese.15

3.3.4. Panchsheel Agreement:- As soon as the Seventeen Point Agreement was signed, China started consolidating her strategic and tactical position in Tibet by constructing a series of roads, airstrips and radio network linking all important towns and districts with capital and at the same time. The Panchsheel Agreement was proposed to India in order to neutralise and eliminate Indian influence in Tibet. Indian visitors and traders in Tibet were subjected to
"scrutiny and hardship". Indirectly, Government of India was pressurised to relinquish her treaty rights in Tibet which she was enjoying as part of its inheritance. India realised that under new set up in Tibet, it is essential to revise and redefine her treaty rights in Tibet. Negotiations for the purpose began at the end of 1953 and were being continued till 28th April 1954. At the end, an agreement on "Trade and Intercourse" between India and China was signed on 29th April 1954. This Agreement came to be recognised as the "Panchsheel Treaty". The Agreement consisted of five principles which govern the relations between India and China. The five principles were:

1] Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2] Mutual non aggression.
3] Mutual non-interference in each others internal affairs.
4] Equality and mutual benefits. And
5] Peaceful coexistence.16

By this Agreement, India withdrew her military posts from Tibet and surrendered communication installations together with equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet to the Chinese Government. And officially recognised Tibet as part of China. As a matter of fact, the "Panchsheel Agreement" marks an important step in India's withdrawal from Tibet under the Chinese pressure. India came to conclusion that Chinese acceptance of "mutual respect for each others territorial integrity" without question by Peking of the existing frontier between India and Tibet (China) means there is no "border dispute" "with China".

3.3.5. Tibetan Revolt And Granting of Asylum To Dalai Lama:- According to the Seventeen Point Sino-Tibetan Agreement, China had given assurance to respect the autonomy of Tibet by giving various commitments. But the 1951 to 1959 era witnessed the gradual and systematic breaking of major assurances contained in the Sino-Tibetan agreement which ultimately resulted in open clashes between Tibetans and Chinese. Tibetan revolt and unrest against China continued from 1956 onwards and in March 1959, there was open revolt against the Chinese forces at "Lhasa" which resulted in further clamping of tighter Chinese controls i.e. desecration of the Monasteries, indiscriminate imprisonment and massacre of a large number of Tibetan people.17
On 31 March 1959, Dalai Lama fled from Chinese fury and came to India. Government of India granted "asylum" to Dalai Lama with 13,000 Tibetan refugees on condition that "political activities" were not permitted to be carried out on Indian soil. Further, the Government of India declared:—

"The Government of India wants to make it clear that they did not recognise any separate government of Tibet and hence there is no question of Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India." 

On the other hand, the Indian Public showed bitterness and anger against China by staging "demonstrations" outside the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. On 20th March, all over India, "Tibet Day" was observed to express solidarity with Tibet. All India Tibet convention was held to offer support to Tibetans for their "freedom". In April 1960, an Afro-Asian convention on Tibet was convened under the chairmanship of Jai Prakash Narayan to mobilise the world opinion on "Tibet". The "Tibetan problem" was discussed in Indian Parliament.

Actually, Chinese stand was that if the Government of India officially accepts "Tibet as an integral part of China", then it should not have discussed the issue in the Indian Parliament and considers it as an interference in the internal affairs of China.

Government of India attempted to clear the prejudice of the Chinese by declaring India's policy on Tibet:—

1] The preservation of security and integrity of India.
2] Desire to maintain friendly relations with China.
3] Deep sympathy for the people of Tibet.

India insisted that instead of using force against the Tibetans, they should be won over by "friendly cooperation" and fulfill the commitments which were mentioned in the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951, particularly "autonomy of the Tibet Region". China asserted to the contrary that "Tibet is an internal affair of China and India should not interfere in it". On 28th March 1959, Chinese official communiqué issued she termed the revolt in Tibet as uprising of higher class reactionaries engineered by the imperialist and foreign reactionaries.
Further on 25th April 1959, the Peking Radio warned:-

"British imperialists and Indian expansionists had better clarify their mind or they will suffer a tragic end."^23

The revolt in Tibet marked the beginning of the end of Sino - Indian honeymoon. The Indians' sympathy of the Tibetans and granting of asylum infuriated the Chinese. And anti Indian propaganda in China, Chinese harassment of Indian traders, pilgrims nationals in Tibet infuriated the Indian public. India continued her efforts to plead China's case for U.N.O.'s membership. During the Korean conflict, "India always stood behind China and gave firm support". India refused to participate in the U.N. General Assembly voting as it was for imposing arms embargo on China and North Korea, as also to participate in the San Francisco conference because China was being excluded. Taking into consideration, India's role throughout the "Korean crisis", Chinese changed their attitude towards India. Chinese Press praised Nehru's statesmanship and remarked, "India as a neutral and peace loving nation"^24 India welcomed the new and soft Chinese policy. The Panchsheel Treaty was renewed in 1956 and in 1958. There was a steady flow of study teams, military missions, educational delegations and exchange of visits between the two countries. "India-China friendship Associations" were also established to promote better understanding and relations."

3.4 **ORIGIN OF INDIA-CHINA BORDER DISPUTE:**

Though "diplomatic relations" were being maintained, year after year. China went on publishing her maps which showed large chunks of the Indian territory along the Himalayan frontier as the territorial limits of China. A map published in 1954 in a Chinese text book, "A Brief History of Modern China" (please see sketch No 1 ) showed Indian Ladakh as part of China. In July 1958, these inflated maps of China were published in "China Pictorial" as also in the "Soviet Weekly", both having world wide circulation. The following Indian territories were shown as Chinese territories in their maps:-

1) Four divisions of Arunachal Pradesh.

2) Some areas in the North of the state of Uttar Pradesh.

3) Large areas in the Eastern Ladakh [which is a part of and Kashmir of India].
The year to year publication of these maps naturally gave rise to suspicions regarding Chinese intentions in Indian political elite. In the Indian Parliament queries were being asked by the members of the House. The Prime Minister stated:

"There is no physical demarcation of the frontier in these mountain passes, although our maps are quite clear on this subject"

Regarding Eastern Sector, he further stated:

"The McMahon Line is the firm frontier, firm by treaty, firm by usage, firm by geography."  

Meaning that India's Northern frontier is not only based on geographical factors, but is also sanctioned by specific international agreements, historic rights, customs, traditions and actual exercise of sovereign power and international law. India's frontier has never been formally demarcated on ground due to the nature of terrain. Explaining the government's policy regarding its orders at length, Nehru stated "willingness to have any kind of conciliatory, mediatory process about minor rectification here and there. Nehru's government was prepared to discuss minor changes but only on the basis of treaties, historical usages and geography.

3.4.1. China's Cartographic Aggression:- Between 1949 to 1958, Peoples Republic of China never raised any "doubts or dispute regarding her borders with India, but continued the cartographic aggression against India. naturally, this "Cartographic aggression" created doubts in the Indian political circles. In 1954, when Nehru went to China, he raised the question of Chinese Cartographic aggression with Chou - En - Lai. Chou replied that:

"these were really reproductions of old maps" and the Peoples Government had no time to revise them".

Even after this, the Chinese cartographic aggression against India continued. Therefore, on 21 August 1958, the Government of India gave a note to the Counselor of China in New Delhi. this note of 21 August 1958 drew the attention of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China again to the matter. Chinese reply was most diplomatic:-
"these maps were doubtless reproductions of old maps, but it had not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary nor consulted the countries concerned, and pending such surveys and consultations, it would not make changes in the boundary on its own." 30

It meant that China reserved her right to declare at any time (which was convenient to her) that the chunks of Indian territories shown in the Chinese maps as belonging to China, were a disputed territory. Between 1949 to 1958, China's border policy with India was a "Reserve Policy".

3.4.2. Series of Intrusions:- Actually, when China grabbed Tibet, India, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan came under some sort of pressure. Immediately, India took appropriate steps to strengthen its position along the Himalayan frontier. And India signed treaties accordingly with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim [Sikkim was an independent state prior to 1974] between 1949 and 1951. Security measures were undertaken to strengthen India's borders. The entrance to NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) was closed to all except those of the NEFA administration and patrolling of frontier and watching of the Check Posts by Assam Rifles was intensified. 31 All these measures taken by India as the Chinese began to consolidate their position and set up posts along the Tibet border with India. Though at the diplomatic level "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" slogan were being raised in both the countries, but at the same time, troops of both the countries were poised along the frontier. Exchange of contradicting notes between the two governments [regarding violation of the frontier] had already started from July 1954, exactly after three months of signing the Panchsheel Agreement.

1] It was for the first time in the history of Sino - Indian relations that China protested against the presence of Indian troops in the Uttar Pradesh at Barahoti (Chinese called it Wu-Je) in 1954. Later, Chinese claimed Barahoti/Wu-Je as their own and did not bother to check whether it was North or South of the border. 32

2] After the Barahoti incident, reports of violations of the territorial integrity in other border areas started reaching New Delhi. On 5th November 1955, the Government of India complained to the Chinese Counselor in New Delhi that a party of 20 Chinese soldiers had trespassed into a place called Damzan and on 2nd May 1956, further protested against the unauthorised presence of Chinese troops in Nilang.
Chinese Encroachment In The Western & Midle Sector

Legend :-
1. Barahoti
2. Damzon
3. Nelong
4. Shipki La
5. Wolong
6. Khurnak Fort
7. Aksai-Chin Area
8. Lohit Frontier Div.
9. Sangcha Malla
10. Lapthal
11. Western Pangog Lake
12. Khinzemane
13. Longju
14. Kongka La
15. Toktsong Gompa
16. Jelep La
17. Hot Springs
18. Chushul
19. Chemokarpola
20. Niagzu
21. Dembur Guru
22. Point 78°12'E 35°19'N
23. Roi Village
24. Chip Chap
25. Sumdo
26. Spongger
27. Road from point 76°35'E, 35°33'N to 78°E, 34°33'N.
28. Point 78°15'E, 35°15'30"N.
29. Galwan Valley
31. Thagla Ridge
32. Dhola Region

Sketch No.10 - Shows Chinese Encroachment In India Territory From 1954 To 1962.

On 24th Sep 1956, India sent another protest note to China about the illegal entry of Chinese soldiers into the Indian side of Shipki La.

In July 1958, Government of India received intimation that the Chinese troops had intruded into Ladakh and occupied India's Khurnak Fort.

The Indian note of 17th January 1959 complained of the Chinese troops illegally having crossed into the Lohit Frontier division of India in September and October 1958.

Prior to 1949, India used to maintain a Consulate General at Kashgar in Sinkiang. As soon as the [Communist] Peoples republic Of China came into power, they declared Sinkiang as a "closed area" and refused India the maintenance of the consulate General at Kashgar and practically stopped Indian trade with Central Asia. Taking advantage of high altitude terrain of Aksai-Chin [part of Ladakh of Indian Jammu and Kashmir], its remote and utterly desolate character and the absence of any Indian consulate at Kashgar, the Chinese constructed Sinkiang -Tibet highway through Aksai-Chin between 1956 and 1957. India learnt through the Chinese newspapers about the Sinkiang -Tibet highway. To make sure whether the road had actually been constructed and crosses through Indian territory, India sent two reconnaissance parties to Aksai-chin in the summer 1958. Out of the two parties, one was arrested by the Chinese and kept in their custody. The other returned and submitted a report that Sinkiang-Tibet highway had already been constructed by the Chinese and it passes through Indian territory. On 18th October 1958 when India gave a note about Sinkiang-Tibet highway crossing through the Indian territory, China replied that the region through which the Sinkiang-Tibet territory passes belonged entirely to them [for details of Chinese intrusion into Indian territory, please see sketch No 10].

Prime Minister Nehru wrote to the Chinese Premier bringing to his notice the situation in the border areas. In reply, Chou - En - Lai sent a letter to Prime Minister Nehru dated 23rd January 1959. This was the first time that China officially raised a border dispute with India and claimed 50,000 square miles of Indian territory and gave a historic twist to the Sino-Indian Relations for the first time in the century. Chinese motivation in relation to the Sino-Indian border policy very well manifested in the letter of Chou - En - Lai dated 23rd January 1959. In the letter, the Chinese raised the border dispute with India, officially in the following language,
"First of all I wish to point out that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically, no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian border had been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and Government of India. An important question concerning Sino-Indian boundary is the question of so called McMohan Line. I discussed this with our Excellency as well as the Prime Minister. I would like to explain again the Chinese Government’s attitude. As you are aware, the McMohan Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and aroused great indignation amongst the Chinese people. Jurisdiction-wise too, it cannot be considered as legal. I have told you that it has never been recognised by the Chinese Government. I hope that this letter will help you to get better understanding of our Government’s stand on the border issue.

"with sincere regards"

(Sd) Chou En Lai

Premier of the State of the

Peoples Republic of China.36

In the end Chou-En-Lai proposed that in order to prevent further incidents prior to finally delimiting the border, both the sides should maintain the status quo, and hopefully, the boundary area question will be peacefully settled through friendly negotiations on the basis of Panchsheel.

Even after that, correspondence between the two Prime Ministers continued, but at the same time, Chinese intrusions on the Indian frontier also continued. In the following months, the two officials (i.e. Indian and Chinese) teams met first at Peking in June-July, 1960, thereafter at New Delhi in August-September and finally at Rangoon in November-December 1960.37 But the talks ended without any positive results. Thus the border issue between India and China became one of the most intractable problems of contemporary Asian politics. Meanwhile, China found it very difficult to continue her hold over Tibet. She started her efforts
to tighten her grip over Tibet. This act of Chinese ultimately resulted in Dalai Lama fleeing from Tibet and coming to India with 13,000 refugees. India granted "asylum" to them on condition that "political activities" were not to be permitted. Thus granting of asylum to Dalai Lama by India definitely marked a distinct and indeed an important watershed i.e. beginning of strained phase in their relationship, in addition to the skirmishes on borders.

3.4.3. **Beginning of Strained Relations**:- After Dalai Lama "asylum" affair, China continued intrusions and infiltration in the Indian border regions. Reports had also arrived, about violations of Indian air space by the Chinese aircraft. India had also complained against the obstacles put in the way of Indian pilgrims, traders and trade agencies in Western Tibet China countered by asserting that Indian aircraft were violating Chinese air space and objected to the expulsions of representatives of Hsin Hua News Agency. As a reciprocatory action, China imposed a ban on Indian diplomatic staff in Peking on celebrating the Republic Day.

On 3rd December 1961 China had proposed for negotiation a new agreement on Trade and Intercourse. India replied that she had on objection to a new agreement on trade and intercourse in principle. Further She explained that negotiations could not be undertaken unless China withdrew its forces from the Indian territory and restored the status quo as it existed in 1954. China refused indirectly India's "conditions" and on 23rd May 1962 conveyed to India its decision to recall its Trade Agencies from India. Immediately India also took reciprocatory actions and the Trade and Intercourse Agreement (Which was signed in 1954) lapsed as on 3rd June 1962.

Prime Minister Nehru's proposal of Chinese withdrawal from the Indian territory and restoring status quo as it was existing "in 1954" ultimately resulted in expiry of the 1954 Agreement and further reflected in "border situations". The situation in border area became more and more tense in due course of time. The exchange of diplomatic protest notes and setting up of military posts, deployment of troops along the frontier, was going on between India and China. On 8th September 1962 [for the first time since 1959], Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line in the Kameng Division of NEFA. On 13th September 1962, China repeated its proposal i.e. withdrawal of the armed forces 20 kilometers along the entire border and proposed 15th October 1962 as a date for discussion and further "course of action". On 19th September 1962, India agreed to hold the discussion in order to remove the current tension in the border region. But on 20th September 1962, Chinese forces crossed the
McMohan Line in ThagLa region and launched an assault against Indian Post two miles East of DhoLa. The skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces for five days continued which resulted in the situation along the Northeast border becoming "quite tense." In spite of this tense situation in the border region notes were exchanged between the two countries. China suggested discussion about the "Eastern Sector" but India rejected any discussion about the "Eastern Sector" and put the condition that the latest Chinese intrusions must be vacated first.  

On 12th October 1962, before leaving for Sri Lanka, Mr. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister told the press reporters that he had asked the Indian Armed Forces to throw the Chinese back.

**3 4 4 India's Forward Policy** - In view of the Chinese activities along the Indian border region i.e.

1] Chinese intrusion into Indian territory

2] Construction of Sinkiang-Tibet Highway through Aksai-Chin, Indian territory [please see Sketch No 8]

3] Deployment of troops and setting up of military posts along India's frontier by the Chinese forced India to take defensive measures

To prevent further Chinese intrusions into the Indian territory, the Eastern Army Command received the orders to establish posts as close to the McMohan Line as possible in order to ensure the effective control of the "frontier." India established military posts along the North and Northeastern frontier. There was no immediate reaction from China but it considered India's forward policy as an "aggressive step." And Chinese continued intrusion into Indian Territory which ultimately resulted in "skirmishes" between Indian and Chinese forces as existence of Indian military posts in border region. At last, these "skirmishes" took the shape of "border war" on 20 October 1962.

Since beginning, Nehru's China policy had always been criticised in the Parliament. When the border dispute was raised, he had never lost sight of the objective of reaching a peaceful settlement, therefore, he had to face the opposition block in the Parliament House. Nehru's China policy was critically described as an "policy of appeasement" by Mr. Kriplani [Praja Socialist Party]. His following statement shows the critical view -
"Our territory has been occupied, our people have been kidnapped, our guards have been fired at, taxes have been collected, roads have been built all leading towards India; check and observation posts established along our borders... But whatever aggression have been there so far, I regret to say that the country has been kept in ignorance of this aggression for a long period, even though many notes through the years have passed between the two countries. The Parliament itself has been kept in ignorance. Information about the aggression has been elicited through questions in this .... House. No information was ever given voluntarily. Even then, it has been meager and often the acts of aggressions have been minimised ..... sometimes, it would appear that there has been special pleading for the Chinese."48

India's defensive measures along with the North and Northeastern frontiers were only to stop further Chinese aggression into Indian territory. India's defensive measures along the frontier misconceived as a "forward Policy" and confirmed to the Chinese that the Indians were prepared to risk an armed conflict with China. Nehru tried his best to settles the "border dispute" through negotiations but at last, Nehru's China policy proved a failure when the actual conflict erupted on 20th October 1962.

3.5. **CHINESE AGGRESSION OF 1962:**

"They came into our house, slapped us and have gone back"

[ Lt Col J.R.Saigal (Retd) "The Unfought War of 1962"]

Early morning of 20th October 1962, under a heavy barrage of artillery and mortar fire, the Chinese assaulted the Indian Positions in the Western and Eastern Sectors. In the Western Sector, Chinese attacked the Indian posts in the Chip Chap, Galwan, and Pangang Tso areas. Wave after wave of Chinese troops in a massive two pronged sweep came close to encircling the 50,000 square miles of Indian, Himalayan territory.

On 24th October 1962, China made a peace offer but India rejected it because they offered the withdrawal of only 20 kilometers from the "Line of Actual Control" which they had created by aggression since the beginning of 20th September 1962.49. The Chinese were in overwhelming strength and attacking in all the sectors. In the Western Sector, the Chinese attacked South of the Karakoram pass at the Northwest extremity of the Aksai-Chin and in
Sketch No. 11:- Shows Tactical Positions Of Indian & Chinese Forces (Eastern Sector)

Pangang Lake an area of 100 miles to the southeast. Owing to poor performance of "logistics" and communication gap, Indian forces were ejected from eleven posts in the vicinity of Karakoram Pass and from several posts near Pangang Lake. Daulat - Beg - Oldi and Chushul was attacked and its airport was constantly under enemy's fire. In spite of difficult situations, Indian troops were entrenched in strong positions and put up a very gallant defense. They beat the Chinese at Chushul and accepted heavy casualties. The heroic deeds of the Indian troops compelled Chinese to give up the idea of capturing Chushul and turned their attention towards Demchok and Jara La area on 27th October 1962. The outlying posts of RezangLa and Gurung Hill and four posts in Spangur area were also overwhelmed by Chinese. Incidentally, Chinese realised that they had been confined only to the arid and inhospitable region of Ladakh. They also found difficulty in maintaining communication and severe problems in terms of logistics and transportation. And therefore, they turned their attention to the more vulnerable and comparatively populous area of NEFA [now Arunachal Pradesh].

3.5.1. Eastern Front: On 8th September 1962, the Chinese illegally crossed the McMohlan Line and came near Thag La and attempted to encircle the Indian Posts at the Tri junction of NEFA, Bhutan and Tibet.

On 20th October 1962, at exactly 5 A.M. the Chinese opposite Bridge III fired very lights. This signal was followed by a cannonade of over 150 guns and heavy mortars exposed on the forward slopes of Thag La. The Indian position which was about 1,000 yards from the river bank came under heavy bombardment of Chinese. The Chinese had planned to concentrate their effort on the narrow DhoLa-Tsangdhar Sector. They shelled Khenzmae prior to an attack against the check post, threatened the Divisional Headquarters at Zimithang and opened the way to thrust towards Lumpu along the Nyamjong Chu Valley.

According to plans, the Chinese bombardment lasted an hour and soon thereafter, infantry assaults followed. The Rajput and Gorkha positions in DhoLa area were assaulted simultaneously with two brigades. One brigade was used to deal with Tsangdhar [which was vital for both sides] and another moved on the Khenzmae- Drokung-Samba-Zimithang axis.

The Rajput positions were attacked from two directions at the same time, they had no hope and were hopelessly trapped. The Rajputs and the Gorkhas put up a spirited fight against overwhelming odds for nearly three hours despite the demoralising lack of artillery defensive.
Sketch No. 12: Shows Deep Penetration Of The Chinese In The Eastern Sector During 1962 Aggression.

Source: General K.V. Krishanarao (Retd.) Prepare Or Perish, Lancer Publisher New Delhi 1987.
fire support. The Namka Chu battle field soon became a mosaic of sprawling human locked in mortal combat.

By 7.45 A.M. it was clear that the Chinese were about to overrun all the Indian positions in the DhoLa Sector. Chinese continued their advance in NEFA. On 22nd October 1962, Longju and Asafila were occupied by the Chinese and on the same day, an assault was launched on the Indian defensive post at "Kibthoo". They had extended the fight from Tri junction point of Bhutan, China and India to the extreme end of NEFA near Diphulka pass. In the next couple of days, they reached Bum La and posed threat to the district Headquarters at Tawang.

Chinese attack was completely one sided affair, a great shock for India and the end of miscalculations, suspense and confusion. Tsangdhar fell on 22nd October, Bum La on 23rd and Tawang Headquarters of 7th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier J.P. Dalvi was lost to three pronged Chinese divisional assault. Thus in the beginning of November 1962, offensive action was taken by the Indian side. On 14th November positioned themselves North of "Walong" at the Eastern end of NEFA. Indians captured the lower slopes of the Chinese strong point but Chinese launched a massive counter attack and recaptured it. As each attack was beaten back, the Chinese launched another (please see Sketch No 11) attack. Finally, Government of India announced on 18th November 1962 the fall of Walong. At Se La, the Indian troops had prepared and made defences and expected that it would hold the enemy back for a number of days. But the same day Se La also fell in Chinese hands which was a great shock for the entire nation. The next day on 19th November 1962, Bomdi La, the Headquarters of the Kameng division of the NEFA was captured by the Chinese. The fall of Bomdi La indeed was a serious military set back for India.

At this time, Chinese were in possession of all the territory which they had claimed in Ladakh and NEFA. The Chinese were only a few miles away from the plains of Assam (please see Sketch No 12). In the Lohit Sector they were not far away from the oil fields and the tea plantations of North Assam.

3.5.2. Three Point Proposal: While the fighting was going on, the Chinese made their first so called "peace offer". It was their three point proposal for the settlement of the boundary
question. On October 24th, 1962 Chinese Government launched a three point peace proposal on terms which virtually amounted to surrender by India.

According to China's three point proposal of 24th October 1962, which was reiterated in the unilateral cease fire declaration of 21st November 1962, India would have had to withdraw yet another 20 kilometers (12 1/2 miles) inside the territory accepted by the Chinese themselves as undoubtedly Indian.

The Chinese proposal envisaged a further withdrawal of 20 kilometers on either side of the McMohan Line as understood by them. This would leave the Chinese forces in control of the vital mountain passes leading into India while the Indian forces would be 20 kilometers to the South, leaving the entire Indian frontier defenceless and at the mercy of any fresh invasion.

In short, acceptance of Chinese proposal would have meant that:-

1) India should not dispute Chinese occupation of 14,500 square miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh area.

2) Chinese claims should be fully satisfied in the middle sector.

3) In the Eastern Sector, the Internationally accepted boundary, the highest Himalayan ridge, should be given up in favour of whatever interpretation the Government of China wishes to put on the McMohan Line and the Chinese should be left in possession of the vital passes leading into India.

Acceptance of the proposal would have meant leaving the Chinese forces well over 100 kilometers (62 1/2 miles) deep inside territory belonging to India. The net effect of this would have been that the entire network of Chinese aggressive posts would have remained intact under Chinese forces poised for further attacks, while all the Indian defence posts would have been eliminated.

There was a big catch. It was undefined, zigzag which has been shifting over the years to match China's demand as well as the advance of its intruding troops inside the Indian territory. On 27th October 1962, Prime Minister Nehru rejected this proposal. 54

3.5.3. U.K. and U.S.A. Aid to India and Their Role:- When the situation created the possibility of Assam falling into the hands of Chinese, then the Prime Minister of India, Mr
P.J Nehru requested the United States of America and Great Britain for help. An immediate response was given by U.K. and U.S.A. Within a day of requisition, air lift was arranged and supplies started arriving at Calcutta and various places. They gave us whatever they were asked to give. No demand was made on India to change her non-alignment policy. No conditions were made about payment. They gave arms, munitions as well as transport planes and other supplies. Later on, the high level delegations of the U.K. and U.S.A. visited New Delhi to ascertain India's requirements and discuss the manner and method of their delivery. Mr Duncan Sandy led the British delegation while Averell Harriman was the leader of the American delegation. U.K. and U.S.A. both were prompt and generous in their help. Only condition was laid that whatever aid was received should be used for resisting the Chinese aggression.

Further during a debate in the United Nations, the representative of U.S.A. Mr Adlai Stevenson drew attention to the "Naked aggression" perpetrated by China against India for which he said "they had been steadily building up for three years". During his speech he stated:

"the Chinese region was a dictatorship, its ideology was power and its aim, professed with pride, and arrogance, was conquest."

Further he stated:

"it is a new imperialism, a new colonialism that seek to carve out a new empire, not only in Asia, and dash the hope of liberty the world over."

Similar sentiments were also expressed by U.K., West Germany, France, Canada, Australia and a number of other countries. But only U.K. and U.S.A. gave generous aid to India and therefore, India should consider that U.K. and U.S.A. were real friends during 1962's emergency. U.S.S.R. never gave any assistance to India during those traumatic days of 1962.

3.5.4. Cease fire and Withdrawal:- Because of military aid, the Indian troops stood gallantly against the Chinese. It was at this time that China declared a "cease fire" which came into force on midnight of 22nd November 1962. The withdrawal of Chinese troops began as scheduled on 1st December 1962. Chinese frontier guards withdrew to positions 20 kilometers from the line of actual control which existed between India and China on 7th November 1959. While going back, they returned to the Indian Red Cross a number of wounded prisoners of war and
material. It was discovered later that the returned material was in damaged condition and the Chinese had carried away all good material, whatever they found, during their withdrawal.57

3.5.5. **Colombo Proposal**: China tried to prove India as the aggressor and China fighting only in self defence. The propaganda did not result into any substantial gains for China. On the other hand, except Albania, most of the countries of the world i.e. Nigeria, Ireland, Mexico, Bolivia, Australia, Norway and U.K. and U.S.A. declared their active support to India.

After the Chinese declaration of cease fire, many efforts were made to settle the India-China border dispute. Non-Aligned countries like Cambodia, Burma, Ceylon, and Ghana arranged the conference at Colombo from 10th to 12th December 1962. The conference put forward the proposal that China would withdraw 20 kilometers from Ladakh front and India to maintain its position. The area evacuated by China, had to be administered by joint civilian posts of both the Countries. About the Eastern Sector, the Line of Actual Control recognised by both the Countries had to serve as a cease fire line. It meant that the India forces could move right up to the South of the line of actual control except for Thag La Ridge and Longju. Chinese forces could similarly move right up to the North of the McMohan Line. With regard to the Middle Sector, the problem had to be solved by peaceful means without resorting to force.58

Although the proposal was against India but China refused to accept it. After 1962, Delhi adopted stern attitude towards China.

3.6. **IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE AGGRESSION OF 1962:**

Prior to 1962 war, the Himalayas were considered as a natural barrier against any invaders from the North. The Chinese invasion proved that there was no natural defence to India's Northern frontiers despite the geographical reality, that Himalayas is not a homogeneous region in terms of Geopolitical imperative of India's security. After the 1962 war, the relations between China and India were naturally strained and Nepal and Bhutan felt the pressure of Chinese aggression. As a result of 1962 war, the Northern borders of India became an active frontier and produced a new awareness for rapid construction of roads and tracks up to the border for strategic reasons. Since 1962, a number of roads were strengthened to meet the requirements of defence for plying of heavy military vehicles besides undertaking heavy construction of other vital links. After 1962, national attention got focussed on the border area states from the defence point of view. Development of these areas were given top
priority which was essentially to meet the defence requirements that were not met earlier. Nehru amongst others had an inkling of the impending disaster. Even then, sufficient measures had not been taken earlier to safeguard India from the possible Chinese aggression. India was not sufficiently prepared against China as it was more than adequately prepared against Pakistan. All this changed after 1962. It was realised that India's Northern borders had to be strengthened against the Chinese threat as well and the Country had to be prepared for it.

3.6.1. Change in Defence Expenditure: Prior to 1962 Sino Indian war, the total budget was very nominal. It was low in absolute terms as well as percentage of GNP was Central Government Expenditure. The situation changed after 1962 war. The defence expenditure of India jumped up from around Rs 474 crores in 1962-63 to Rs 816 crores and thereafter showed a gradual increase. In 1962, the Department of Defence production was created for expanding the Defence Production base to meet the increased requirement of the Armed forces rather than to meet social demands added to the ecological hazards.

3.6.2. Change in Thinking: Prior to 1962, the majority of the writers on matters of defence considered that defence expenditure to be unproductive and a drain on the scarce national resources. But the same Debate after the Chinese onslaught advocated massive increase in "Defence Expenditure". It was realised that maintaining our territorial integrity is the primary function of the state and as a corollary, the defence expenditure was not only considered desirable and essential but also it was thought that the defence expenditure is not entirely unproductive and a waste.

3.6.3. Change in Threat Perception: India did not expect the Chinese to take any large scale aggressive action in regard to the border dispute and had made no preparation for the defence of the Northern border. On the other hand, China had made all the military preparations at each and every point of view. Prior to 1962, it was assumed that a major threat to Indian security could come only from Pakistan. This point can however be debated and it can be argued by the late 1950s.

3.6.4. Change in Foreign Policy, Defence Planning and Management: Prior to 1962, the concept of defence was not very well appreciated. Nehru romanticised foreign policy and advocated non-alignment. The Panchsheel policy gained ground because it was realised that the cold war between the two superpowers had a negative impact on the third world countries. In his quest for peaceful coexistence, Nehru failed to fortify the country's defence and in
particular, the Chinese threat was either not foreseen or underestimated. The Chinese aggression however shattered Nehru's myth that threats to security could be met by peaceful diplomatic moves. It confirmed the news that defence consciousness in the nation was wanting and the need was felt for maintaining armed forces for resisting any external aggression.59

The reasons for the 1962 debacle range from sheer incompetence to faulty intelligence, from lack of coordination between the three Services to developing tension between them. The relations between the Defence Minister Krishna Menon and the Chief of the Armed forces were stated to be strained. It was alleged that the Defence Minister refused to take note of the reports of the previous Generals regarding the Chinese preparations for launching an attack on India who were unprepared from various point of view. The 1962 war was an extremely important event for India, its foreign policy and defence. After the debacle of 1962, several heads rolled and the policies with regard to use of force were changed. The most notable aspect was the change in concept of defence planning and management.60

Once the nation recovered from the initial shock and the nature of long term threat became clear, it was realised that the defence potential cannot be built in a matter of weeks or months and thus the Government set about organising defence preparedness in a more systematic manner. The Government realised that it had to think of defence planning as long term problem. The immediate aims in 1963 were:-

1) Expansion and modernisation of the Army.

2) Modernisation of the Air Force.

3) Creation of an adequate defence production base.

4) Improvement and expansion in the means of communication and transportation.

5) Replacement of overage ships of the Navy and making it a balanced force.

The national defeat of 1962 led to a new thinking on the need for long term planning on defence issues and the result was that, for the first time in post independence India, Five Year Defence Plan was prepared in 1964. In 1964-65, a five year defence plan from 1965-66 to 1969-70 was formulated and implemented.
3.6.5. **In brief, the Plan Envisaged:-**

1) The building of and maintenance of a well equipped Army with a strength of over 8,25,000 men.

2) Maintenance of a 45 Squadron Air Force including replacement of older aircraft by modern aircraft and improvement of the air defence radar and communication facilities.

3) A phased programme for replacement overage ships of the Navy.

4) Improvement of road communications and transportation in the border areas.

5) Strengthening of the defence production base to eventually meet the requirement of arms and ammunition of the Armed Forces, improving the general organisational arrangements in the fields of provisioning and procurement, storage, training etc, to ensure most economic utilisation of funds allocated for "Defence".

3.6.6. **Geopolitical Advantage:-** The Chinese strategy appears to have been aimed at bullying the smaller nations of Asia and simultaneously lull India into a false sense of complacency. China made serious moves for border agreements with other countries, and pursued a policy of pinpricks and subversion in respect of the very countries with whom it later concluded border agreements. This game could not continue after 1969 when India showed herself ready to meet the Chinese challenge.

 Politically, China tried to isolate India from her neighbours. China settled her border dispute through negotiations with Nepal on 21st March 1960 and with Burma on 28th January 1960 on terms favourable to those nations and made overtures to Pakistan and did not aggressively pursue her demands upon Nepal and Burma. China concluded a border treaty with Pakistan and is going to settle her border dispute with Bhutan.

 Thus China gained a diplomatic advantage from a geopolitical point of view by effectively isolating India from her neighbours. The impact of Chinese invasion of 1962 affected India's prestige in terms of Nepal and Bhutan. Chinese were successful politically to isolate India from her neighbours. The Chinese influence in the Himalayan region increased. China conducted nuclear test in 1964 to match-up India's defence preparedness. And established close links with Pakistan.
3.6.7. **Sino-Pak Ties**: After 1962, India continued to have strained relations with China who in turn continued to interfere in the internal affairs of India. China supported and encouraged separatists movements in India. And giving military, technological and nuclear aid to Pakistan. China constructed Karakoram highway through Pak occupied Kashmir and established close links with Pakistan, so that she may be used against a common enemy i.e. India. Chinese supported Pakistan at the time of 1965 and 1971 war and continues her military, technological and nuclear aid till date.

In sum, the Chinese attack on India in 1962 was a totally unilateral and a premeditated attack on India. The Chinese invasion of 1962 brought into sharp focus the future of the Himalayan kingdom being aligned with India or China. She tarnished the image of India amongst her neighbours. In short, the 1962 debacle proved that too much reliance on Panchsheel diplomacy was no insurance against external attacks. It was also realised that "defence preparedness" cannot be isolated from the overall nation building activities. After the death of Pundit Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri made a great contribution in executing a change in policy towards defence preparedness. He brought up the humiliated Country to level off defence preparedness that proved itself in 1965 Indo-Pak war. The same policy was continued by Mrs. Indira Gandhi after Shastri's death and which resulted in 1971 victory. India regained the prestige and status as a "**Dominant Power**" in South Asian region.

3.7. **INDIA CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE WAR OF 1962:AN ERA OF HOSTILITIES:**

After 1962 war, India took a firm stand against China who continued with negative and intransigent attitude towards Colombo proposal and commenced propaganda against India. She conducted nuclear explosion in 1964 October. In 1965 Indo-Pak war, China declared her active support to Pakistan. China kept up pressure on the Sino-Indian border by violating the Line of Actual control. Defence Minister Mr Chavan informed the House that since 15th September, China had intruded across the Line of Actual Control on 33 occasions, and further informed that:-

"**The Chinese have ever since August/September in collusion with Pakistan, started a policy of harassment and aggression on our borders . . . . they have increased their strength along the border. Whether we like it or not, we have to live with the Chinese presence along with our borders and meet their**"
challenges as best as we can ... we have taken steps to deal with the Chinese threat in a suitable manner, depending upon operational needs and circumstances.\textsuperscript{66}

However, there were no major clashes on the Line of Actual control during 1966 but the Chinese continued with series of minor intrusions across the entire border area. A kind of intrusion is that she started loudspeaker propaganda across the Nathu La advising Indian troops to revolt against the present Government of India and set up a Peoples Government in India. She openly supported Naga, Mizo and Naxalbari insurgents and described them as "fighting against India's neo-colonisation".\textsuperscript{67}

3.7.1. Violation of Diplomatic Code: - On 13th June 1967, China expelled two Indian diplomats from Peking on the grounds that they were indulging in espionage activities and put the entire Indian Staff of the Indian Embassy and their families in Peking under siege in the Embassy's walled compound. This act of Chinese resulted into a serious deterioration of India-China relations. India took reciprocal actions against the entire Chinese staff of the Chinese Embassy at New Delhi. At last, China lifted the siege of the Indian Embassy in Peking on 2nd June 1967. India reacted swiftly which resulted on she lifting the restrictions on the movements of the Chinese staff and allowed the Chinese Secretary to leave New Delhi as a part of reciprocal action.

3.7.2. Nathu La Incident: - On 11th September 1967, Chinese launched an attack at Nathu La with heavy mortar, recoilless guns and artillery fire. This was most serious incident since 1962 war. Chinese intrusion at Nathu La followed by firing of automatic weapons which continued from 11th to 14th September. On 15th September China handed over the dead bodies of Indian soldiers with arms and ammunition for the sake of "preserving Sino-Indian friendship".\textsuperscript{68}

Though the Chinese had launched a heavy attack at Nathu La, for the first time since the 1962 war, Indian troops gallantly defended their positions and beat back the Chinese. This incident was nothing but the testing of India's defence preparedness and extreme end of deadlock in Sino-Indian relations.

3.8. RAPPROACHMENT IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS:

In 1967, Congress Party won the elections and returned to power with shrunken majority at the Centre. Tense situation at the Actual Line of control, deadlock in Sino-Indian
relations at diplomatic front, forced the leader of the ruling party to visualise the importance of China. Owing to this situation, Government realised that it would be in India's interest to give up its rigid insistence on the Colombo Proposal and inject some flexibility in the situation. On 1st January 1969, Mrs. Indira Gandhi at a press conference disclosed that the Government was prepared to "try and find" a way out of solving the dispute with China. Without insisting on its acceptance of the Colombo proposals as a precondition.

However, China did not respond to Indira Gandhi's offer for negotiations on border problem. In late 1970, informal diplomatic contacts between Indian and Chinese diplomats were established. Meanwhile, Indian attempts at rapprochement were brushed off by the turmoil of East Pakistan. India continued her efforts towards "normalisation" by explaining the situation in East Pakistan to China through its mission in Peking which ultimately resulted in less critical stand of China on East Pakistan problem. China invited India to participate in Afro-Asian Table Tennis Tournament which was scheduled to be held in November 1971 at Peking. As a part of this gesture towards improving relations, India removed the Police Post maintained outside the Chinese Embassy. On 25th October 1971, U.N.O. granted admission to China. India congratulated and expressed the hope that cooperation between India and China in the world body would lead to peace and progress in Asia. During the Indo-Pak war of 1971, China was less critical of India than in 1965 war. India's attempts were not in vain because Chinese were responding slowly and steadily towards normalisation. Fresh efforts were not made to consolidate relations till the Janata Government came to power in 1976. Janata Government made a good beginning to improve India's relations with China. In that direction, the foreign Minister Mr Atal Behari Vajpai visited China, but at the same time, China attacked Vietnam. Mr Vajpai reacted very sharply and left the Country without any discussion. After that no fresh efforts were made by India to improve her relationship with China.

After the death of Mao, China realised the importance of maintaining relations with India. They started reassessing its foreign policy of Maoist era. The Foreign Minister of China Mr Huang Hua attained the Republic Day celebration function for the first time after 20 years and expressed the desire for improving relations between the two countries. Political power again changed in India and Mrs. Indira Gandhi regained power as a Prime Minister and renewed efforts to improve India's relations with China. The Chinese Foreign Minister Mr Huang Hua came to India in June 1981 for two days meeting with Mrs. Gandhi (Prime
Minister) and Mr Narasimha Rao, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Apparently, China did not put up any proposal about the border issue.72

3.8.1. "Border Talks": From 1962 War till 1980, there had been no quiet exchange of views, no prodding of each others thinking either on territorial issue, or on the nature of their future interaction. And seemingly, there was no real compulsion to normalise relationship between the two countries. But between 1970 to 1980, the "regional events" and "politics" compelled China to change her foreign policy, be a good neighbour and coexist in peace with all.

U.S.S.R's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 indeed disturbed the strategic balance in the South Asian region. Iranian revolution, Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea (Cambodia) which China perceived as a threat in the form of an encirclement by the Soviet Union. U.S.A. started arms supply to Pakistan, India started to justify U.S.S.R's presence in Afghanistan. further, an agreement was also signed between the Soviet Union and India for a supply of Military hardware. All these political events and the situation demanded that China should develop friendly relations with India for two reasons:-

1) For its security.

2) As well as to safeguard its interests in South Asia.

In addition, domestic compulsions, Tibetan problem and her dream to become well progressed industrial nation . . . etc. factors which compelled China to normalise her relations with India. Meanwhile, Hua Goufeng met Mrs. Indira Gandhi at Marshall Tito's funeral in Belgrade and expressed a desire that China will like to develop cordial relations with India. On 4th November 1980, P.T.I. (Press Trust of India) signed an agreement with Xinhua (Chinese News Agency) under which both sides were to exchange information. Later, next year both the Countries began official talks for normalisation of relations.73

1] First Official Level Border Talk After 1962:- The first official level border talks were held in Beijing from 10th to 14th December 1981. Indian delegation led by Mr Eric Gonsalves - Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and Han Nialong, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China. During the discussion, China offered a "package deal" as a solution to the border problem which India straightaway rejected and stressed "sector-wise examination" as against the Chinese proposal. China thereafter suggested that the border issue
be frozen and progress can be made in the fields of science and Technology, trade, socio-cultural exchanges etc. India accepted this suggestion on condition that while proceeding towards cooperation, at the same time, an attempt should also be made for settling the border problem. India rejected the offer of keeping the crucial border issue being "frozen".

Though the first official level talks failed to yield an acceptable solution, both the countries were determined to sign an agreement and also agreed to continue their efforts to resolve their differences on the "boundary issue". Reporting the matter, the Chinese official news Agency Xinhua quoting Mr Huang Hua, stated that:-

"the talk that Chinese and the Indian officials are now holding on the boundary and other questions will surely have a positive influence on furtherance of friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries".

It was Mr Huang Hua's first public statement on the recent nature of Sino-Indian relations. Throughout the negotiations, an amicable atmosphere prevailed. Addressing the members of the Parliamentary consultative committee for External Affairs, Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao [then the Minister of External Affairs] stated:-

"there are wide differences on the border issue, but it continues to be the take off point. The improvement of Sino - Indian relations is not only the common desire of the two peoples but it is beneficial to the strengthening of peace and stability in Asia and the world." 

Both the sides adopted a positive attitude towards further development of relations between the two countries. Throughout the talks, an air of frank and friendly exchange of views on the boundary question prevailed.

II] Second Round of Border Talks: - From 12th to 20th May 1982, the second round of border talks was held at New Delhi. The Indian Delegation was led by Eric Gonsalves, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, and Mr Fu Hao from the Chinese side. During the talks, the Chinese proposed that they were willing to accept the present "Line of Actual Control" in the Western and Eastern Sectors as a boundary as a solution to the border problem. India again rejected the proposal stating that it was nothing but the reiteration of the "package deal" in different language. It meant that the Chinese had made no progress beyond
the package plan. India reiterated its stand that the solution to the "border problem" has to be found from beyond the package deal.

Chinese very seriously and sincerely expressed their desire to resolve the border question the earliest. During the discussion, both the parties suggested a set of guiding principles as a basis for Sino-Indian dialogue. China put forward five principles:

1] Equality.


3] A fair and reasonable settlement.


5] A comprehensive solution.

India suggested a set of six principles as against the Chinese set of five principles:


2] A just solution taking into account the legitimate interests of both the sides.

3] A common approach and a basis for discussion.

4] Consideration of each others proposals.

5] Steps to create an appropriate climate.

6] Efforts to settle the border issue in each Sector.

Eric Gonsalves stated:--

"India-China relations were imposed by the logic of our being neighbours, by the interest of our two people and by the challenges we face in the region and in the world of today."78

Both the sides tried to narrow down their differences but no breakthrough was possible.
Third Round Of Border Talks [February 1983]: The third round of official border talks was held from 28th January to 2nd February 1983 at Beijing. During the talks both sides repeated earlier and known positions. For instance, India raised the Colombo proposal to counter the Chinese five principles which they suggested during the second round of border talks as a basis for dialogue on solution of the border problem. India's positions was that it would discuss the legality of the case as the legal positions of the two sides had been fairly well documented in the official reports of 1960. The Indian side was willing to make sure that it would seek some common ground without abandoning its legal position.

The Indian delegation was led by Mr K.S. Bajpai, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, who was also the Ambassador to China. Fa Hao, a special Envoy and Advisor to the Chinese Ministry of External Affairs headed the Chinese side. At the conclusion of the talks, it was said, "both sides were positive in their attitude in negotiation on the boundary questions and the atmosphere was friendly."

However, no progress was made towards the settlement of the border problem.

Fourth Round Of Border Talks: The fourth round was held at New Delhi from 25th to 30th October 1983. The first significant change was in the composition of the delegations. In the Chinese delegation, Assistant Minister, Liu Shuking, Head of the First and Second Asia Departments and Ambassador to India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and by Gong Dafei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, the Indian Delegation was led by Mr K.S. Bajpai and assisted by then Ambassador to China, Mr A.P. Venkateswaran and the High Commissioner to Malaysia, Mr Ranjit Sethi.

India had adopted a new approach namely to proceed with normalisation in other spheres without permitting the border dispute to obstruct the process of normalisation. It indicated willingness to compromise on part of India and thus this round enhanced the exchange in the field of media, arts, science and trade sectors. Chinese agreed with the Indian proposal of sector-wise examination of the border dispute for a comprehensive settlement on the basis of maps, historical usage, records, old claims, and legal and actual positions of the respective Armed forces on ground. It was thus agreed that both sides will refrain from using force in the settlement of this issue. An attempt was also made to bridge the wide distance that separated the basic negotiating positions of two sides. This round proved fruitful and indicated a measure of compromise on both sides, more so on part of China. This development
introduced both flexibility and purpose into the border talks without which they would have reached a dead end.

The first three rounds not surprisingly, were remarkably unproductive. They were at best an exercise in testing the political behaviour of both sides. After the 1962 war, both the countries came together on the negotiating table to settle their differences through peaceful means. The two Asian giants were determined to bring "new era" in their relations through scientific, socio-culture and trade .... etc exchanges. The first four rounds certainly proved a good beginning and pragmatic approach in their relationships. Better understanding has been created by these four rounds of border talks. Therefore, China accepted the Indian proposal i.e. sector wise examination and discussion. India and China came to the conclusion that "use of force" will not solve their problems and therefore, both the sides agreed that they would refrain from using force in settlement of the border dispute. Trade relations between the two countries improved.

V) Fifth Round Of Border Talks:- September 1984 :- From 17th to 22nd September 1984, the fifth round of the border talks at official level were held at Beijing. During the talks, attempts were made to find words and phrases more acceptable to both. e.g. India asked for recognition of the legitimate interest of both the countries which China rejected. Chinese objected because they thought legitimate implied legalistic which could be interpreted by India who may insist on recognition of the McMohan Line. When India suggested the words "just and satisfactory"; China welcomed it.

The gains of third round were that both the sides agreed to maintain status quo. Contact had been made at high political level and the Chinese renewed their invitation to Mrs. Gandhi to visit Beijing. They were determined to make all possible efforts to achieve at the earliest, a solution of the "border problems" and at the end of the Fifth round, declared that the "differences had been narrowed down". During this Round, China was prepared to settle dispute along the McMohan Line in the Eastern Sector with "minor" concessions by India and discussed in detail the modalities but subsequently domestic politics led to an abandonment of this proposal, as Mrs. Gandhi was concerned about the forthcoming elections in 1985. Mrs. Gandhi did not wish to give an impression of India bargaining from a position of weakness. Thus India lost an opportunity to settle her crucial border dispute with "minor" adjustment with China on account of "political prestige".

VI) Sixth Round Of Border Talks: November 1985: The sixth round of border talks was held in New Delhi from 4th to 10th November 1985. It was in many ways a negative turning point. Adopting a sector by sector approach, both sides explained their respective positions on the Eastern Sector. The Chinese side made a serious study of their historical claims South of the McMahon Line on the basis of the Chang dynasty records and they became more vocal about their claims in the Eastern Sector. The leader of the Chinese delegation once again offered a "package deal" and described it as compromise settlement which was both just and fair. There was no counter proposal by the Indian side.

During the Sixth round, China introduced a new element i.e. demand for territorial concession by India in the Eastern Sector and showed no flexibility in the western sector from her side. It declared that the Eastern Sector is the biggest disputed territory and the Indians are in occupation of as much as 90,000 square miles of Chinese territory. It appeared to convey the message that they would cast off the negotiations if the Indians adopted an uncompromising attitude in the Western Sector (Aksai Chin) for the settlement of the border problem. Thus instead of expecting progress, it brought both the sides back to square one. After the Sixth Rounds of border talks, reports arrived in "New Delhi" about the Chinese intrusion in an area known as Sumdorong Chu Valley (Tawang District) in Arunachal Pradesh of India.

VII) Seventh Round Of Border Talks: July 1986: The Seventh round of Border Talks was held in a tense atmosphere on account of the Sumdorong Chu incident. Despite the strains and the newly generated tension however, the Seventh Round was held from 21st to 23rd July 1986 in Beijing. Sumdorong Chu Valley incident was discussed in detail. During the discussions, India claimed that in mid June 1986, 40 Chinese personnel had intruded 7 kilometers in Sumdorong Chu Valley area of Arunachal Pradesh. China claimed that the area already belonged to them and there was no question of intruding in the Indian Territory by the Chinese personnel (please see Sketch No 13). The Sumdorong Chu Valley incident had clouded the Seventh round of Border Talk and the relations between the two Countries were governed by acrimony, tension and drift and brought China and India very close to a major military clash after 25 years. The official statement in Beijing summed up the Talk thus:-
"the two sides enhanced their mutual understanding but made no headway. China laid claim to 90,000 square kilometers territory in the Eastern Sector in Arunachal Pradesh. India reaffirmed its claim to 38,000 square kilometers in the Western Sector in Aksai-Chin and 2,000 square kilometers in the Middle Sector. The Indian side noted a hardening of the Chinese stand, the Chinese pointed out that India was demanding only one side to make concessions."

VIII] Eighth Round Of Border Talks: November 1987: From 16th to 18th November 1987, the Eighth Round of talks were held at New Delhi. During the Talks, the following points were discussed:

1) Both the sides restressed the urgency to prevent military confrontation.

2) Issues regarding economic cooperation and trade were discussed.

3) Border issues including maintenance of peace and tranquillity at the border area.

"Sumdorong Chu incident" till the beginning of the Eighth Round remained in memory, therefore, both the sides restressed the need to "avert" "military confrontation" as they realised that "military confrontation" will not solve their problems. Economic cooperation and trade between the two countries would develop if peace and tranquillity could be maintained at the border area by both the sides. Therefore issues regarding economic cooperation and trade were intensively discussed. Both the sides realised that the border issue could not be settled at the bureaucratic level and that it requires certain political direction and atmosphere. In view of this reality, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi decided to visit China in December 1988.

This Eighth Round of border talk ended without yielding an acceptable solution of the border issue. After completion of the Round, the Indian political commentator informed in brief:

"what seems to have been achieved is the awareness of the need for a political initiative. At present time, there has come about an understanding on the steps to de-escalate armed confrontation on ground, a move which will be facilitated in this season of heavy snow in the concerned area. It is also agreed by both sides that conscious efforts need to be made for stepping up trade and economic cooperation while more activity in the field of cultural cooperation"
will certainly help better understanding at the popular mass level. Exchange at ministerial level visits seem to be on the agenda. 

3.8.2. **Analysis of Political Negotiations:** The Eighth Round of the border talk also failed to yield an acceptable solution because of differing views, opinions and stands towards the settlement of border issue. The Chinese opinion is that the border problem could be solved on a "give and take" basis or in other words, by a "package deal". China would like to give formal recognition to the McMohan Line and in return India should leave her national claim on Aksai Chin. China will cede less strategic areas of occupied Ladakh and in return, India would have to withdraw from "Tawang". But India made it clear that Tawang is not negotiable.

The Chinese mainly emphasised on "demarcation". It is only when both sides agree where the boundary really lies on ground and it has been marked out on detailed maps, establishing boundary pillars and an agreement concluded, then it can be considered as formalised. In short, the Chinese emphasised the terms for the formalisation i.e. actual demarcation of the boundary on the ground.

India's view is different than the Chinese. Her view is that this boundary has been recognised by tradition and customs for centuries, it has determined the limits of administration for the last 300 years. And therefore, the boundary can be treated as formally settled and considered to be a "historical demarcation". There is no necessity to demarcate it again. India's opinion is that the border problem can be solved on the basis of "equality and mutuality". Legally and historically, the Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai-Chin Area belongs to India but China by force has grabbed the Indian territory in both the areas. Thus India's opinion is that the issue has to be submitted to the International Court of Justice. The border problem being solved on the basis of equality and mutuality means that the Chinese should give up some territory in the Western Sector (Ladakh) besides recognising the McMohan Line in the Eastern Sector.

India's view is that the border problem will be solved by a sector wise examination on the basis of maps, historical usage, records, old and legal claims and actual position of the armed forces on the ground. It however seems that the Chinese are not satisfied. They are interested only in improving her relations with India by expanding area of cooperation and to
continue only negotiations and negotiations on border problem. In short, the Chinese are satisfied with maintaining "status quo" in terms of the present situation on the border.

India's insistence that China should withdraw her forces from all areas occupied by her before the 1962 hostilities is regarded by pro-China elements as futile. Since then several rounds of border talks have been held, frequent gestures of friendship have been made and false hopes aroused of a settlement of the crucial border question. But the search for settlement seems endless, both the Countries are "tough bargainers". From 1960 to 1988 there were three opportunities for settlement of border dispute:-

1] In 1960, when Chou-En-Lai visited India Nehru had displayed flexible attitude and showed keen interest in settling the border dispute with China but his Cabinet colleagues protested against it. Proposal was to Exchange Aksai Chin with Strategically valuable Chumbi Valley, but it was rejected by Nehru, atlast owing to protests by his colleagues.

2] During the Fifth Round of Border talk in 1983-84, China was prepared to settle the dispute along the McMohan Line in the Eastern Sector with "minor" concession but owing to the forthcoming elections, Mrs. Gandhi did not wish to convey the impressions of Indian weakness and it was the second opportunity which India lost owing to standing on her prestige alone.

3] (Late) Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had never been serious in negotiating with the Chinese. His stand on the border dispute consisted of "not loosing even an inch of territory".

3.9. POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS: A NEW OUTLOOK:

After confirmation of the views and deliberations during the last eight rounds of border talks by the bureaucrats, they came to conclusion and a firm opinion that the border issue could not be settled at the bureaucratic level and therefore, direct talks by the political leaders are inevitable. As Prime Minister of India Late Mr. Rajiv Gandhi took initiative and visited China from 19th December to 23rd December 1988. His visit was a major landmark in improving India-China relations. The visit of Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to People's Republic of China broke a 30 years chill in Sino-Indian relations. Regional as well as global issues were discussed in a positive manner. Both the countries came to the conclusion that the mutual and
cordial relationship between the two major countries of Asia i.e. India and China were much more important for the mutual benefits of both rather than obstructing them because of border dispute.

i) **Joint Working Group**:- During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, both the leaders of India and China agreed to setup a "Joint Working Group" to evolve consensus border between India and China. The Joint working group was also bound with a time frame of two to three years. This attempt was perhaps the most serious one to resolve the border dispute on the principle of mutual understanding and accommodation which would be acceptable to the people of both the countries in terms of mutual interests and benefits.\(^\text{i}\)

ii) **Nature of Joint Working Group**:- The Joint Working Group is led by the foreign secretary on the Indian side and the Deputy foreign Minister from the Chinese side. During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, it was also determined that JWG will meet at stipulated intervals and make recommendations to their respective governments. Also, it was expected to include military officers and surveyors, governors and generals from both the sides.

iii) **Objectives of Joint Working Group**:- There were three main objectives of establishing Joint Working Group:-

a) Make concrete recommendations for an overall solution to the boundary question within a definite time frame. That solution must be acceptable to both the parties which would be in their mutual interests and mutual benefits.

b) Ensure the peace and tranquility in the border area, until the final settlement is arrived at.

c) The working group conceived as a joint undertaking involves institutions like foreign minister, military experts, surveyors, communications experts and legal bodies on both the sides.\(^\text{ii}\)
3.9.1 Progress of Joint Working Group From 1989 onwards:-

I] The First Round:- The first round of Joint Working Group was held in Beijing from 30th June to 4th July 1989. The Indian delegation was led by Mr. S.K. Singh, Foreign Secretary and Mr. Lin Shu Quen - Vice foreign Minister by Chinese. The "General lines" on which the future work should progress in the further meetings of the group were intensively discussed and it was agreed that emphasis should be laid on look forward into the future in a practical, realistic and workman like manner. Regarding maintaining of Peace and tranquility on the border, both sides recognised that there was a need for confidence building arrangements. It was also determined to take concrete steps to diversify and expand trade, culture, Scientific and technical exchanges.

Both the sides realised that the urgency of maintaining peace and tranquility in the border area i.e. the outcome of this talk. The tangible achievement of the previous eight rounds of talks were that both sides had agreed to change the level and methods of talks, which ultimately resulted in the first meeting of a Joint Working Group. Hence credit should be given to (Late) Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, as JWG was established during his state visit to China.

II) Second Round of Joint Working Group:- The second meeting of JWG was held at New Delhi on 30th and 31st August 1990. The Chinese delegation was led by Mr. Qi Huai Yuan - Vice Foreign Minister and the Indian side by Mr. Muchkund Dubey, Foreign Secretary. During the talks, both the side enhanced significantly their understanding of each others approach to the solutions of the Boundary problem. All efforts were made to adopt a practical and realistic approach and look towards the future. The two side also determined to establish contacts between the Military personnel of both the countries. To remove the hurdles in the process of maintaining peace and tranquility in border area. "Invitation" was also renewed by both the sides to visit their respective countries and reiterated their determination to maintain and further strengthen the momentum of their relations.

The main achievement of this second round of JWG meeting, was that the "Mechanism" introduced between two countries was that their military personnel will meet from time to time at an appropriate level, with a view to maintaining Peace and Tranquility in the border areas.
Peace and Tranquility will certainly assist in creating cordial atmosphere between the two countries to proceed towards solution of the border problem.

III) Third Round of Joint Working Group: The third round of India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question met in Beijing on 13th May 1991. The Indian side was led by the Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey and the Chinese side, by the Vice Foreign Minister Mr. Xu Duxin. The two side were serious in talks and discussed better relationship and commitment of the two Governments to seek a solution within the framework of an agreed approach. It was also determined that neither side would do anything to upset the tranquility along the border and both side would address the issues in a spirit of accommodation and the principle of mutual acceptability. They also discussed measures for the strengthening of peace and tranquility and mutual confidence in the border areas. And exchange their "Views" on bilateral, Regional and international issue. In spite of political uncertainty, sincere discussion was held between the two countries because by that time India was under a caretaker government. An ultimate gain of this meeting was that two side had a serious discussion about "measures" in terms of how to maintain peace and tranquility along the "Actual Line of Control". It was the beginning of the course of actions, which they determined at the Second Round of JWG.

IV) Fourth Round of Joint Working Group: The fourth round of India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question met at New Delhi on 20th and 21st Feb. 1992. Chinese side was led by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Xu Dunxin and Indian side by Mr. J.N. Dixit. During the talks, finally two sides agreed on the "Concept" of maintaining peace and tranquility on the line of Actual Control and a series of specific steps for it. And agreed that in view of the "Confidence building measures", to hold meetings more frequently, meet as and when necessary instead of within a rigid time frame. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Xu Dunxin used two phrases:

1) The boundary question is complex and should not stand in the way of across the board expansion of the relations between the two countries and -

2) The problem of boundary needs an approach of sincerity and "Patience".

"Patience" means "bridging" the gaps, narrowing the differences on a long term basis, on the boundary issue between the two countries will take time as it is considered (the border issue) a "Legacy of the past".
Significance of this 4th round of Joint Working Group was that both delegations had representatives from the "Defence Ministry" from the civilian side and an Army officer of the rank of "Brigadier" to discuss the measures for the "Course of action" in maintaining peace and tranquility on the line of Actual Control. Throughout the discussion, the atmosphere was candid and mutually accommodative. Suggestions for "Confidence building measures" made across the table (From both side) were accepted. The fruits of this talks were that JWG moved from "Concepts" to "specifics" and from "ideas" to "measures" with regard to stabilisation of the Line of Actual Control and building up on peace and tranquility there to settle the "Boundary Problem". Overall discussions were satisfactory, meaningful and positive.

V)  **Fifth Round of Joint Working Group:** The fifth meeting of the India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question was held at Beijing on 28th and 29th October 1992. The Indian delegation was led by the Foreign Secretary, Mr J.N. Dixit and the Chinese side was represented by Mr. Xu Dunxin - Vice Foreign Minister. This was the first time that the JWG met twice in the same year. This was indicative of the importance that both sides attached to the work seriously and sincerely. The positive experience of implementing Confidence building measures agreed at previous meetings of the JWG was reviewed and "Further Steps" were considered which suggested by both Views were exchanged on bilateral issues and steady progress in bilateral relations and international issues. Points "for further border trade also discussed in detail". An overall discussion were constructive, candid and held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. This fifth round of India-China Joint Working Group spent especially to create a cordial atmosphere and expand the an area of co-operations between the two countries.

VI) **Sixth Round of Joint Working Group:** The sixth meeting of the India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question were held at New Delhi on 25th and 26th June 1993. The Chinese delegation was led by Vice Foreign Minister Mr. Tang Jia xuan and Indian delegation by Foreign Secretary Shri J.N. Dixit. Both the side expressed their satisfaction at the manner in which the confidence building measures agreed upon at the previous meetings of Joint Working Group were being implemented. Different views were exchanged on further measures to ensure peace and tranquility in areas along the line of actual control between the two countries. Attempts were also made by both sides to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement of India-China border question. As a part of steady and perceptible improvement in bilateral ties, an additional border trade point at Shipki La Pass has been introduced.
Sketch No. 14 :- Shows The Location Of Border Trade Points.

was to be in addition to the existing border trade point and Lipulekh in the middle sector of India-China boundary please see Sketch No.14.

The outcome of the talks was that additional measures were determined to ensure the peace and tranquility along with line of actual control. Steps were taken to improve their bilateral ties i.e opening an additional border trade point at ShipkiLa pass.

VII. Seventh Round: - The seventh meeting of the India-China joint working group on the boundary question were held in Beijing on 6th and 7th July 1994. The Indian delegations was led by the foreign secretary and the Chinese delegation was led by Vice Foreign Minister Mr. Tang Jiaxuan. The two sides continued discussions aimed at arriving at a fair reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the boundary question. Discussions were held on the implementation of the "Agreement of the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along The Line of Actual Control" in the India-China border areas which was signed on 7th September 1993 during the visit of Prime Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao to China. Both the sides were pleased and noted that the situation along the India-China line of actual control was peaceful and agreed to introduce additional points for meetings between the border personnel of the two Countries. During the talks, text of the agreement on avoidance of double taxation, area of health, medicine memorandum of understanding on establishment of banking relations etc were also finalised.

As far as "gains" of this 7th round are concerned, an additional point for meetings between the border personnel of the two Countries and the texts of various agreements to further improving bilateral ties were also finalised.

3.9.2 Role of Joint Working Group In Sino-Indian Relations: An Evaluation:- Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's State visit to the Peoples' Republic of China in December 1988 definitely created a "thaw" in Sino-Indian relations. During his visit, owing to "global scenario" and its repercussion on their regional interest and order, came to the conclusion that mutual and cordial relationship between the two major countries of Asia i.e India and China were much more important for the mutual benefits of both rather than obstructing each other because of border dispute only. This (conclusion) realisation on part of both the countries led to develop a basic understanding that:-
Sketch No. 15 :- Shows Progress & Prospects Of India-China Joint Working Group.

Sources :- Self Prepared On The Basis Of Study.
1] To deal exclusively with the border question.

2] Improving the bilateral ties for mutual benefits of both the countries.

Improvement in bilateral ties, and expansion of area of cooperation certainly will create a cordial atmosphere. Thus improvement in bilateral ties and mutual understanding with political direction was more likely to automatically solve the "border problem" between two countries [please see Sketch No 15 showing the framework and achievements of the JWG].

After Rajiv Gandhi's state visit to China in 1988, Chinese suppressed the pro-democratic movement in "Tianeman Square". Most of the countries reacted sharply but India reacted very cautiously, termed it as an "internal matter" and prevented direct criticism of Chinese leadership. Furthermore, India did not postpone the first meeting of "Joint Working Group" which was already scheduled to be held in July 1989. From 1989 onwards, the seventh meeting of Joint Working Group have already been held in alternative capitals. The gains of Seven Round of Joint Working Group are as follows:

1) **Confidence and Security Building Measures**: During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, it was already determined by both sides that they will maintain Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control. And in that direction, Joint Working Group discussed the measures in that context to avoid necessary and unnecessary Skirmishes, exchange of fire, and to clear the misunderstanding or any conflict. The following measures have already been taken and are being implemented. Thus since Sumdurong Chu incident in 1986, there has been no Chinese intrusion in frontier area. Confidence building measures are as follows:

   a) To preclude an accidental conflict and ensure continued peace. Hot lines for direct communications between commanders of border personnel were established in Feb. 1992.

   b) To establish "facts" on actual ground, the meetings at Bum La [North of Tawang in the eastern sector] and Spangur [near Chushul in the western sector] would be held in June and October of each year. These meetings are organised and conducted by the military personnel from both sides.
c) To inform well in advance regarding proposed "Military Maneuvers" on one side is provided to the other and mechanisms for handling possible air intrusion on either side are being put in place.98

Implementation of these security measures were effectively continued therefore, it was noticed that ever since Sumdorang Chu incident, the India-China border is "quite peaceful".

2) **Improvement In Trade**: Sino-Indian trade had gathered momentum after 1982. The trade relations stagnated with every phase of cooling off of the political relations. The trade between two countries improved as per political relations. The total volume of trade between India and China in 1981-89 is estimated at Rs. 196.8 crores out of this, India's exports to China were valued at 64.4 crores and imports from China at Rs. 1324 crores.99 India imports Chinese Chemicals, Machinery, Nonferrous, Metals, Transport equipment, raw silk and exports Tobacco, Shellac, Wire Rope, Chrome ore, Electronic components, Transmission equipment, Jewelry and iron. From 1989 to 1995, various trade protocol, agreements have also been signed between India and China. A Joint Commission on bilateral Cooperation in Science, Technology and space was established in 1989.100 According to PTI, China [Pune Sakal dated 6th Jan 1995] is also supplying "Uranium" to India as a part of trade agreement. Supply of "Uranium" which was refused by U.S.A. and France but China is supplying Uranium [a strategic material] to India. Border trade is also being continued between the two countries since 1989.

3) **Institutional Links**: As a part of developing cordial relations between the two countries, government and non-governmental bodies have also established contacts in India and China. Particularly trade unions, and women's organisations are developing contacts in China. The Chinese communist party (CCP) has direct links with political party of India i.e. Communist party of India, Bharatiya Janata Party and Indian National Congress ... etc. Contacts between Xin hua News Agency of China and Press Trust of India have also been established towards exchanging information, News and Programmes. A "Festival of China" was staged in India during 1992 and "Festival of India" was celebrated in China in 1994 April.101

4) **Exchange of Visits and Signing of Agreements**: The exchange of visits at high level has contributed to creating a cordial atmosphere between two countries. In 1988 December, (Late) Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi paid an official visit to China as a part of reciprocal and protocol. Mr. Peng paid an official visit to India in December 1992. There is the anticipation in
1994 of Chinese president Jiang Zemin reciprocating the visit of former Indian president R. Venkataraman in May 1992 and Indian Vice President K.R. Narayanan returning the visit of chairman Li Ruihan of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference in Nov. 1993. The Defence Minister and Service Chief of both countries also exchanges their visit, which will increase the knowledge and awareness of each other's capabilities and intentions.

a) **Defense Minister Visits China:** When Mr. Sharad Pawar was the Defence Minister of India, he paid an official visit to China in July 1992. The Indian delegation produced a list of arms of Chinese origin that had found their way into the Punjab and Kashmir valley via Pakistan. A question of Chinese activity on the Hanguyi and Coco Island, was also raised by the Indian delegation. Chinese considered it and replied that as the issue has been raised for the first time, they need time to study it.102

b) **Li Peng Visits India:** In response to Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, Chinese Prime Minister Mr. Li Peng paid an official visit to India in December 1991. During his visit to India, the two countries signed:

1) Memorandum on the resumption of border trade.

2) Agreed Minutes of the Third session of the India China Joint Group on Economic Relations and Trade, Science and Technology.

3) Trade protocol between India and China for the calendar year 1992.

4) The two Ministers also signed an India-China consular connection.

5) The agreement on the Re-establishment of consulates General is based on the successful completion of discussion between the Ministry of External Affairs of India, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. The Consulates are being opened in Bombay (India) and Shanghai (China) in April 1994.103 The Consulates were reestablished after a gap of 29 years.

India's Prime Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao and China's Mr. Li Peng, agreed to base the new world order on the five principles. Further, the Joint Communiqué was published during Li Peng's visit to India. The Joint Communiqué mainly considered the new international order and
attention paid to create an environment friendly to Third World countries in their search for economic growth. The Communique Notes that:

"In the absence of economic development there will be no genuine peace and stability in the world."

After reiterating the five principles of peaceful coexistence, it outlines the additional principles that "should govern the new international order". The additional principles of Joint Communique were as follows:

1) Every country big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, is an equal member of the international community entitled to participate in the decision making and settlement of international affairs.

2) Efforts should be made to check the arms race and realise effective disarmament.

3) Efforts should be made to address the growing gap between the north and south. The developed countries are urged to address the question of mounting debt burdens of developing countries, worsening terms of trade, inadequacy of financial flows and obstacles to technology transfers.

4) The principles of the United Nations Charter and the relevant international human rights instruments on the protection should be respected. For the vast number of developing countries, the right to subsistence and development is a basic human right.

c) **Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao Visits China:** Indian Prime Minister Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao paid an official visit to People's Republic of China from 6th to 9th September 1993. During his stay in China, four accords were signed:

1) Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas.

2) Agreement on Environment cooperation.


4) Agreement on Radio and Television cooperation.
Out of above four agreement "Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the India China Border Areas" is the most important, which shows the sincere attitude of both the countries and their keen interest in maintaining Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control. According to this agreement, both the sides will reduce their troops from the Line of Actual Control. Neither side will use the force or threaten the use of force against each other. This agreement is based on mutual confidence and better political understanding. The implementation of this accord will continue till the joint working group produces a solution to the border problem. An expert group has also been set-up to assist the joint working group in implementation of this agreement [for details of this Agreement please see Appendix No 11].

India China Expert Group: - An "Expert Group" has been set up to assist the Joint Working Group in implementation of the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, which was signed in Beijing on 7th September 1993 during Prime Minister Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to China.

The first meeting of the India-China Expert Group was held at New Delhi from 2nd to 4th February 1994. The Indian delegation was led by Shri Shivashankar Menon, Joint Secretary (North-East), Ministry of External Affairs. It consisted of representatives from the Ministries of External Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs, the Army Headquarter and the Survey of India. The Chinese delegations which also included experts from their concerned departments, was led by Mr. Fu Xuezhang-Deputy Director Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 106

During this first meetings of Expert Group, after discussion, both the sides reached basic agreement on many issues relating to its mandate, future tasks and methodology and noted with satisfaction that the situation along the India-China border area is peaceful.

The Second meeting of the Expert Group was held in Beijing on 21st and 22nd April, 1994. The expert group reviewed the progress made at its first meeting. The achievement of this second meeting was that the two sides reached agreements on the work regulations of the Expert Group. This document, which spells out the mandate for future talks and modalities of the Expert Group was signed by the leaders of the two delegations on 22nd April, 1994. 107
The gains of these two meetings of "Expert Group" are that both the sides determined the nature of their tasks in terms of implementing the accord. The doubts and queries regarding the strength of army troops to be withdrawn and the numbers to remain along the actual Line of control, were settled. the distance to which both the sides will withdraw from the actual Line of Control ... etc. were also discussed. And after all the discussions, the framework will be prepared and then step by step the accord will be implemented.
FOOT NOTES


2) P.C. Chakravarti, "India-China Relations" [Mukhopadhyay Publisher, Calcutta 1961.] P-12.


9) OP. Cit Nancy Jetly, P. 251.


11) V.B. Karnik (Editor), "Chinese Invasion Background and Sequel" [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 7, 1966] P-152-153


17) Op Cit, Nancy Jetly, P.56.

18) Ibid PP, 74-76.


21) Ibid P.97.

22) "The Statesman", [Calcutta], 5th May 1959.


25) Ibid P.47.


28) Op Cit, Nancy Jetly, P.84.


30) Ibid P.46.

31) "The Hindu", (Madras), 18th April 1959.


34) Ibid PP, 46-47.

36) Ibid PP. 52-55.


40) Op cit, Nancy Jetly, P.158.

41) Ibid PP. 160-162.


43) Ibid PP. 71-78.

44) Ibid PP. 100-102.

45) "The Hindu". (Madras), 13th October 1962.


48) Government of India, Lok Sabha Debates [Vol. 34, 1959-60], Cols 8006-13], see also, op cit Nancy Jetly p.92.


56) Ibid PP. 204-205.

57) Ibid PP. 221-222.

58) H.H. Dodwell, Op Cit, PP. 1007-1008.


62) "Indian Express", 8th January, 1989, (Bombay).

63) Lt.Col Gautam Sharma (Retd), and R.S. Nagar (Editor) "India's Northern Security : Including China Nepal and Bhutan", [Reliance Publishing House, Delhi, 1986], P.40.

64) P.C. Chakravarti, Op Cit, P.172.

65) V.B.Karnik, Op Cit, PP. 238-240.

66) Op Cit, Nancy Jetty, P. 236.

67) Gopal Ji Malviya, "Sino-Indian Relations Security Environment in Nineties", [The Director Publication Division, University of Madras, 1992], P.82.

69) "Times of India", 21st January 1969, (Bombay).


72) A.G. Noorani, "Has PM Accepted Deng's Package Deal", *Indian Express*, 19th Nov. 1989, (Bombay).

73) Gopal Ji Malviya, "Sino-Indian Relations Security Environment in Nineties", [The Director Publication Division, University of Madras, 1992], PP. 87-88.


76) Satish Kumar (Editor), *Year Book on India's Foreign Policy 1985-86*, [Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1988], PP. 150-152.

77) "No Headway Likely on Border Issue", Editorial Page "Indian Express," 22nd October 1983, (Bombay).


79) Gopal Ji Malviya, OP.Cit, P. 90.


81) Satish Kumar (Editor), Op cit, P. 153.


84) "Indian Express", 19th Nov. 1987 (Bombay), (Editorial Page-Border Talk).


86) Gopal Ji Malviya, Op Cit, P.166.

87) "Indian Express", 21st Dec 1988, (Bombay).

88) "Indian Express", 23rd January 1989, (Bombay).

89) "Deccan Herald", 9th July 1989, (New Delhi PTI).


96) "Indian Express", 21st Dec 1988 (Bombay) (Editorial Page).


100) Surjit Man Singh, Op Cit, PP. 295-296.


